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Radioaktív szállítmányok gyors, in situ ellenőrzési módszerei
Radioactive materials are shipped in most countries within the framework of regulations and laws. 
In almost all cases the supervision of the shipments is in the hands of governmental organisations. 
In situ checks during shipment cover several areas, but it is usually limited to checking the shipping 
documents and packaging. There is no quick and easy field-based method for verifying the content 
of the documents. This inspection method helps to detect rough differences between data written 
in shipment documents and in reality. As a result of the inspection, the officer will know, whether 
it is worth investigating further or not. The method contains multiple measurements made by 
intelligent detectors. Unknown values like activity of the transported source and shielding efficiency 
of the container can be estimated with the help of incoming measured values combined with the 
information from the shipment documentation. The method was confirmed with real Cs-137 source 
and with an isotope container.
Keywords: radiation measurement, detection, radioactive transport, intelligent detector, ADR 
class 7, activity determination
Radioaktív anyagok szállítása a legtöbb országban rendeletekkel, törvényekkel szabályozott 
keretek között zajlik. A szállítás ellenőrzése szinte minden esetben hatósági feladat. A szállítás 
közben végrehajtott helyszíni ellenőrzés korlátozódik a szállítmány okiratainak és a csomagolás 
külsejének ellenőrzésére. Arra nem létezik gyors, egyszerű, a terepen végrehajtható módszer, hogy 
a dokumentumokban szereplő adatokat ellenőrizni lehessen, a csomagban lévő radioaktív anyagok 
aktivitását meg lehessen határozni. A közleményben ismertetett módszerek segítséget adnak arra, 
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hogy fel lehessen fedezni a durva eltéréseket a papíron szereplő adatok és a valóság között. A mérés 
eredményeként a végrehajtó állomány tudni fogja, hogy érdemes-e tovább vizsgálódni vagy nem. 
A módszer többféle intelligens detektorok által végrehajtott mérést tartalmaz. A módszert valós 
forrással (Cs-137) és egy izotóptartállyal ellenőrizték.
Kulcsszavak: sugárzásmérés, detektálás, radioaktív transzport, intelligens detektor, ADR 7. osztály, 
aktivitás meghatározása
Introduction
The purpose of this research is to find out whether the capabilities of officials responsible for 
controlling radioactive transport can be improved. International standards recommend checking 
transports with radiation detectors. The IAEA suggests using a handheld instrument that should 
be held against the surface of the package to measure the dose rate.3
The regulation in the EU for Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) gives a maximum radiation 
limit of 10 mSv/h at any point of the package and categorises the packages according to 
a measured dose rate at the surface and 1 meter distance from the package.4
The aim of all international regulations is to have a reasonably acceptable radiation level 
for the personnel involved in transportation. All these levels are calculated back to the personal 
and collective dose limits of the current regulation. There is no intention in these regulations, 
to question the veracity of the information declared by the supplier. Despite the fact that an 
incorrectly categorised shipment can cause serious environmental damage, nuclear accident 
or unnecessary radiation exposure.
Basic Inspection Method
Radioactive material transportation requires a lot of documentation. In these documentations, 
there are some parameters, which could be the input data of an inspection. There are some 
parameters that can be checked easily without any measuring instruments, and there are 
measured parameters to validate the theoretically stated values and category levels.
The first step of a basic inspection is to collect all the available data from the documenta-
tion and check if there is any contradiction. Knowing all category levels and comparing them 
with the available data needs time and experience. In order to make the inspection quicker and 
easier, a demo application called Radiation Inspector was created. The officer has to type the 
data into the mobile software and the application will do the comparison.
The following information should be available in the documentation to conduct a basic 
inspection: Type of the radionuclide, activity of the source, the date when the activity 
measurement was conducted or calculated, dimension of the package (height, weight, and 
3 IAEA 2012.
4 United Nations 2017.
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diameter of the container), shielding wall thickness, material of the shielding, transport index, 
criticality safety index, category according to ADR rules.
After filling out a form in the mobile application, the data is stored and analysed. With the 
help of comparison and calculation algorithm the following potential issues can be filtered out:
• Shipment documentation contains higher activity as the allowed limits.
• The package is not categorised correctly according to ADR rules.5
• Stated parameters contradict each other, e.g. the volume of the container calculated 
from the dimension is different from the volume calculated from the weight.
Comparing data with limits is an easy task, there is no need for further explanation, but finding 
contradiction related to the stated source activity is more challenging. The source with the 
stated activity should generate a theoretical dose rate at a specified distance in the air, which 
is reduced by the shielding effect of the container. Equation (1) shows that the theoretical dose 
rate can be calculated from the activity.6
(1)
Dr: theoretical dose rate
A: activity of the source
d: distance between the source and virtual detector
E: gamma emission energy
P: emission probability per disintegration respectively
µ/ρ: mass absorption coefficient for tissue
x: shield thickness
μ: linear attenuation coefficient for shielding
B: build-up factor
Special parameters like the buildup factor are properties of the shielding material. If all the ba-
sic input variables (isotope type, shielding and distances) are known, all other necessary static 
parameters (mass absorption coefficient, gamma emission energy, etc.) are already defined by 
former studies and simply used by the algorithm automatically, the officer does not need to 
be an expert to know them off the top of his head.7
The theoretical dose rate can be checked by a real dose rate meter. If the measured value is 
in the same range as the theoretical dose rate, the validity of the activity stated in the trans-
portation documentation is correct.
For this measurement, the most suitable instrument is a certified dose rate meter which 
has a wide measuring range in energy and dose rate and can be connected to a data collector 
5 United Nations 2017.
6 Magill 2019.
7 Chilton, 1967.
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that can collect other parameters as well. I used the RadGM dose rate transmitter for this 
measurement (Figure 1), which has the energy range of 50 keV … 3 MeV and the dose rate range 
of 30 nSv/h … 10 Sv/h. The RS-485 interface and the compact size makes it ideal for this task.
Figure 1. RadGM dose rate transmitter
Source: Gamma Zrt. 2019
If the activity is unknown, it should be determined from the dose rate measured without opening 
the package. There are many issues that could add error to this measurement. E.g. the error of 
the detector, the effect of other radioactive material. It is important to establish a controlled 
environment for this measurement.
Figure 2. Schematic of a radioactive transport package
Source: Made by the author
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Another problem with this measurement is that usually some of the parameters are not avai-
lable in the documentation or could be incorrect. E.g. the container parameters (wall thickness, 
material, etc.) are not mandatory to include.
Radioactive sources are transported in different packages. High activity level sources are 
typically transported in cylindrical shape lead containers (Figure 2). The radiation leaving the 
source in every direction has to go through the lead shielding of the container thus the intensity 
is reduced according to the wall thickness of the container.
The wall thickness is the most essential parameter because it needs to be used for the cal-
culation of the dose rate (1). The thickness can be measured directly only by opening the con-
tainer, which can cause unnecessary exposure to the conducting officer. On the other hand, it 
can be calculated solving the following (2) equation using parameters, which can be measured 
outside of the container without any radiation exposure risk:
(2)
x: shield thickness
r: radius of the container
m: height of the container
Vt: total cylinder volume of the full container calculated from the outer dimension
(3)
Vs: solid cylinder volume of a solid lead container calculated from the weight of the container
(4)
s: the weight of the container
ρ: density in case of lead: 11.4 kg/dm3
The total cylinder volume (3) and the solid cylinder volume (4) can be calculated from the 
transportation documents and/or from measured parameters made by standalone instruments 
like a scale or measuring tape. If the measured and stated data are not in the same range, 
further inspection is needed. The deviation between the two volumes can be explained by the 
different material of the container (non-lead) or there can be some other goods (e.g. illegal 
drugs) placed next to the source.
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Advanced Inspection Method
The next level of the inspection method requires the integration of several measuring instru-
ments. I call this method advanced inspection, this leaves out all parameters stated in the 
documentation and rely only on the actual measured data.
Currently, I tested this inspection method only with a cylindrical isotope container and with 
one source per container, without the effects of other nearby radioactive packages.
Figure 3. Schematic of an advanced radioactive package inspector system
Source: Made by the author
The container was placed on an automatically rotating platform (Figure 3 part 2). The platform 
has a built-in scale (Figure 3 part 3) to measure the weight of the container. A robotic arm 
(Figure 3 part 8) was installed next to the rotating platform, which is able to move the sensors 
automatically next to the surface of the container. In this application, the robotic arm was 
used for two reasons. Firstly, the radiation level next to a container can be high, thus human 
exposure can be avoided. Secondly, the container should be measured around at the same 
distance and with constant speed. Holding the dose rate meter by hand will add errors to the 
process, a robot does this task more accurately.
At the end of the robotic arm, a couple of sensor modules were installed. An ultrasonic 
distance sensor (Figure 3 part 7) is responsible for measuring the height of the container. The 
second distance sensor (Figure 3 part 6) controls the robotic arm to move the sensor head as 
close to the container as possible and after one turn it calculates the diameter of the container. 
A laser module (Figure 3 part 5) is also placed on the platform to see the actual point of interest 
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in the container. A dose rate meter (Figure 3 part 4) is used for registering the actual radiation 
level around the container. The detector should be calibrated according to the “IEC 61017:2016 
Radiation protection instrumentation – Transportable, mobile or installed equipment to meas-
ure photon radiation for environmental monitoring standard” to reduce errors.8
After starting a measurement the instrument follows these steps: The robotic arm finds the 
nearest and lowest position to the container. The turntable starts rotating. After one round, 
the arm will lift the detectors head. The rotation and lifting process will continue until the top 
of the cylinder is reached. The whole surface of the container is scanned with this method. 
After analysing the data, the following information will be available:
• The highest dose rate at the surface of the container. It can create an alarm event if it 
is higher than the ADR limit.
• The shielding efficiency and consistency of the container. The main purpose of the con-
tainer is to reduce the radiation coming from the source inside of the container. The 
radiation can escape in all directions. If the wall of the container is not homogeneous, 
or the source is not in the correct position, the radiation will be higher at one specific 
spot. This hot spot can be the consequence of an air bubble in the lead created during 
manufacturing or a fracture of the container as the result of an earlier accident. Every 
container which suffered damage should be excluded from any transportation.
• The diameter, height and the weight of the container. With all this information the 
thickness of the shielding wall can be estimated.
• The estimated activity of the source. The calculated activity can be compared with the 
activity stated in the shipment documentation and the category of the shipment.
Visualisation
If the container has a weak point in the shielding, the advanced inspection method will give 
only the highest dose rate as a result, but there will be no information about the location of 
this specific point. It is hard to give any point of reference to find the problematic part of the 
container. The best way is to visualise the whole container coloured according to the measured 
values. For this purpose, the dose rate was stored for every angular sector during the rotation. 
The saved values were combined with a cylindrical model to show the results in Figure 4.
8 International Standard 2016.
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Figure 4. Visualisation of the radiation level of a container loaded with Cs-137
Source: Made by the author
The container in Figure 4 suffered no damage, but we can see that the shielding is inhomoge-
neous and/or the source is not placed in the centre of the container.
Isotope Identification
A potential error factor can be in the process of activity estimation. If the type of the isotope 
is not stated correctly in the documentation, the activity calculation will give the wrong 
result. To avoid this error the source in question should be identified. The identification can be 
conducted without opening the container. For this purpose, I used the SFK search and isotope 
identification unit (Figure 5). If the identification is not successful, the identified energy peaks 
and the count number at these peaks will give the energy level and probability of the gamma 
radiation, which can be used for the calculation as well.
Figure 5. SFK search and isotope identification unit
Source: Gamma Zrt. 2019
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Surface Contamination of the Package
There is one additional factor that can cause a calculation problem. If the surface of the con-
tainer is contaminated with radioactive material, the calculation can give a wrong activity 
estimation. Every surface contaminated container should be excluded from transportation. 
A traditional surface contamination monitor cannot be used in this case, because the effect 
of the source inside the container will modify the measured value. The best way is to take 
a smears sample from the surface of the container and check it far from the container in a low 
background measuring place with beta and gamma measuring unit. I used the IH-111L mobile 
spectrometric instrument for this application (Figure 6).
Figure 6. IH-111L Portable radiological measuring instrument
Source: Gamma Zrt. 2019
Validation of the Inspection Method
The validation of the inspection method was conducted by using real radioactive test sources 
in laboratory conditions. A 93.14 MBq activity Cs-137 source was placed in a lead container. 
The dimension and weight of the container were measured: height: 20.5 cm, diameter: 10 cm, 
weight: 16.7 kg. Wall thickness was calculated from these parameters: 3.23 cm.
The wall thickness of the container was measured with calipers. The result of this 
measurement was 3.45 cm wall thickness. The calculated and measured wall thickness already 
has a difference of 0.22 cm. This difference can be explained by the uneven wall thickness of 
the container.
The measured average dose rate at a distance of 30 cm from the instrument was 3.1 uSv/h. 
The calculated activity was: 198 MBq, which is 104.8 MBq more than the activity inside of 
the container. There are multiple causes of the difference. First, I used the average dose rate, 
secondly, I used standard lead parameters (build up factors). The container consists not only 
of lead but steel as well. If the radionuclide type is not correct i.e. instead of Cs-137 the cal-
culation used Co-60, the result will be 2.6 MBq, and this major error shows the importance of 
isotope identification.
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Conclusions
I analysed different levels of inspection methods. The basic level does not need any special tools 
or equipment. The advanced inspection method relays only on measured parameters, and not 
trusting the transportation documents. The models work in laboratory conditions but at a high 
error rate. In order to achieve more accuracy, the model should be modified. More tests should 
be conducted at different distances with different isotopes (Cs-137 and Co-60 etc.) and with 
different containers (lead, tungsten, steel, etc.), the algorithm should be able to handle more 
container types (e.g. rectangular). The advanced inspection method can be improved with 
multiple collimated radiation detectors. This will speed up the inspection time, and with colli-
mation, the source localisation process can be more accurate. The instruments can be a useful 
tool to prevent a major industrial accident.9
The integration of spectrometric detectors to the system could give more information, and 
it can be used in other applications, like waste measurements.10
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